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The concepts ofmind, soul, and consciousness are key to an understanding ofourselves
and how we interact with the universe around us. Ian Barbour names the mind/body prob-
lem as one of the major subjects of long-term discussion among religion, philosophy, and
science, including cognitive psychology. However, his treatment of the traditional philo-
sophical positions on this topic is wanting. What is most intriguing is that, after years of
discussion, newer approaches to the mind/body problem seem to have comefull circle, shar-
ing many commonalities with the much older approach of property dualism.
And here are trees and I know their
gnarled surface, water, and I feel its
taste. These scents of grass and stars
at night, certain evenings when the
heart relaxes - how shall I negate this
world whose power and strength I
feel? Yet all the knowledge on earth
will give me nothing to assure me that
this world is mine. You describe it to
me and you teach me to classify it.
You enumerate its laws and in my
thirst for knowledge I admit that they
are true. You take apart its mechanism
and my hope increases... What need
had I of so many efforts'? The soft
lines of these hills and the hand of
evening on this troubled heart teach
me much more.
—Albert Camus,
The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942 1
Introduction
How can the view that the world is made
of mindless physical particles be reconciled
with the intuitive perception that human be-
ings have rational, free, and independent
minds? Does neuroscience threaten the no-
tion of "soul"? Can the "mind" be identi-
fied through closer examination of the
brain—to "enumerate its laws" and "take
apart its mechanism"? These are but a few
of the questions fundamental to a true un-
derstanding of our psychology and our-
selves, questions that underlie the discus-
sions among science, religion and philoso-
phy on what has become known as the
"mind/body problem."
The Aristotelian world did not require
nor consider a distinction of mind from body.
However, mental events began to be viewed
differently following the scientific revolu-
tion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries. While his elder contemporary, Galileo,
was dislodging humankind from its central
position in the physical universe, Descartes
offered a model for maintaining the dignity
and special status of human beings. Accord-
ing to Descartes, the pineal gland, a pea-sized
sphere near the middle of the brain, serves
as junction box between one's physical body
and non-physical mind. 2 In the following
centuries, the idea of a rational mind that
resided outside of the mechanistic world
would help to ensure that the determinism
inherent in Newton's physics did not extend
to human-related concepts of free will and
morality.
Despite its broad acceptance, the ghost-
in-the-machine position of dualism does not
come cheap. The notion of a causal rela-
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tionship between the two radically differ-
ent entities is fraught with epistemological
problems. Mental events are held to be non-
spatial, yet at the same time they are be-
lieved to have influence on the spatially ex-
tended physical body. How, then, do men-
tal phenomena, such as feelings, thoughts,
sensations and intentions, result in the
movement of one's hand
or perspiration on one's
brow?
Descartes attempted
to solve this problem by
hypothesizing the exist-
ence of a "transducer" in
the pineal gland. We
now know that the pi-
neal gland serves no
such function. More-
over, such a solution
merely begs the question, by offering a
metaphysical substance that can interact
with both physical and mental entities. To
date, no such substance has been identi-
fied. Although several thinkers had sug-
gested that the mind is reducible to the ac-
tivities of atoms, the separation of mind
and matter was a principle that received
wide acceptance by philosophers, theolo-
gians, and the general public of Descartes'
age and long after.
Referred to as the "mind/body prob-
lem" by Western scholars, a broad range
of positions has been developed regard-
ing the mind and its relationship to the
physical body. Each position has its
strengths and its own set of inherent diffi-
culties; I do not intend to summarize the
arguments for and against each position.
Rather, I offer here a critique of Ian
Barbour's analysis of the more important
treatments of the mind/body problem, as
presented in his book, Religion and Sci-
ence. I shall expand the discussion in key
areas by providing a more detailed account
of the range of proposed solutions to the
mind/body problem, and I shall challenge
what I believe to be a number of over-gen-
eralizations and mischaracterizations
within Barbour's presentation.
Alternative Views of the Mind
Barbour identifies dualism, material-
ism, two-aspect theories, and multilevel
theories as the four main alternatives re-
garding the mind/body relationship. 3 Re-
While his elder contemporary, Galileo,
was dislodging humankindfrom its
central position in the physical uni-
verse, Descartes offered a modelfor
maintaining the dignity and special
status ofhuman beings.
garding his analysis, I lay out brief argu-
ments in support of the following claims:
• that Barbour's characterization of du-
alism is overly simplistic;
• that his category of materialism omits
important details and includes others that
should be elsewhere;
• that a separate category of philosophi-
cal behaviorism might be appropriate;
• that his two-aspect theories category
is a mixing of property dualism and philo-
sophical behaviorism; and
• that the range of positions might bet-
ter be characterized as a circle, rather than a
linear continuum.
Dualism
While Barbour presents dualism as a
single concept, most philosophers draw a
distinction between substance dualism and
property dualism. It is the former that is most
commonly associated with Descartes and to
which Barbour appears to be referring, when
writing about dualism.
In an effort to rid himself of unsupport-
able ideas, Descartes systematically chal-
lenged each of his own thoughts and beliefs.4
He concluded that his belief in his own exist-
ence as a thinking entity remained as the only
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belief beyond doubt ("Cogito ergo sum").
Because one can doubt the existence of one's
own body but not that one is a thinking mind,
Descartes reasoned that there must be a radi-
cal difference between these two types of sub-
stances. The substance dualism position is
distinguished by its view of minds as wholly
separate, nonphysical entities, distinct from
and independent of the physical body. A
popular version of this position holds that the
mind resides within the body's physical ma-
chinery; specifically, the mind is inside the
head and intimately interacts with the brain.
Property dualism does not postulate
separate physical and nonphysical sub-
stances, but rather a brain with properties
unlike those of any other physical structure.
These properties cannot be adequately de-
scribed by reducing the mind to physical
mechanisms. For the most part, the proper-
ties of conscious intelligence are forever
beyond the purview of the sciences.
While Barbour presents the concept of
epiphenomenalism as a form of materialism,
I agree with Churchland5 that it is more ap-
Epiphenomenalism suggests that men-
tal events ride "above" the phenomena
of the brain. The mind is like a layer
of oil on the surface of the ocean that
believes itself to be pulling the waves
up and crashing them on the shore.
propriately classified as one of the forms of
property dualism. Simply put, epiphenom-
enalism suggests that mental events ride
"above" (epi-, in Greek) the phenomena of
the brain. The mind is like a layer of oil on
the surface of the ocean that believes itself
to be pulling the waves up and crashing them
on the shore. In reality, of course, while the
ocean affects the motion of the oil, the oil
has no influence over wave action. The in-
fluence is unidirectional only.
On the other hand, interactionist property
dualism, or interactionism, envisions a two-
way influence: mental events do have a causal
influence on the brain and behavior, as well
as vice versa. Psychological phenomena are
an integrated but irreducible aspect of neuro-
logical functioning. As discussed below more
fully, this dualistic perspective has a good deal
in common with several of the positions pre-
sented as alternatives to dualism.
Materialism
The materialist position, that mental
states are exclusively states of the brain, is
perhaps the most common position held by
philosophers and cognitive scientists today.
There are a number of varieties of material-
ism or physicalism, however, each with dis-
tinctly different implications for the status of
the mind and the field of cognitive psychol-
ogy. Three of the more prominent material-
ist positions are type identity theory, elimi-
native materialism, and token identity theory.
Type identity theory was developed
partly in response to new findings in neuro-
science during the 1950s and '60s. This po-
ll sition proposes a one-to-one
relationship between each
mental event and a specific
pattern of neurological fir-
ing. Mental states are, there-
fore, identical to the associ-
ated brain activity.
Eliminative material-
ists, on the contrary, argue
that talk of mental states
should be abandoned and re-
placed with references exclusively to brain
states. Moreover, they propose that cogni-
tive science should ultimately be abandoned
in favor of neuroscience. Research in neu-
roscience does not support the one-to-one
correlation that type identity theorists claim.
Finally, token identity theorists uphold
the notion of mental events but reject the type
identity theorists' assertion of a direct, one-
to-one correlation between specific mental
events and neurological events. This posi-
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tion is most consistent with the field of cog-
nitive psychology and has led to the philo-
sophical position of functionalism. Func-
tionalists hold that mental events can be ex-
amined independently of neuroscience and
are classified in terms of their causal role.
Barbour begins his section on material-
ism by pointing to behaviorism as an ex-
ample of materialism, an incorrect classifi-
cation, I believe. Before explaining why be-
haviorism should not be categorized in this
way, the distinction between psychological
behaviorism and philosophical behaviorism
should be pointed out. The first is an em-
pirical research program that rejects appeals
to mental events as explanations of behav-
ior. By contrast, as philosopher William
Bechtel explains, philosophical behaviorism
is primarily concerned with the
semantics of our common mentalistic
vocabulary.... The goal is to translate
terms that purport to refer to mental
activity into terms that speak only of
behaviors or propensities to behave in
certain ways.6
Both psychological and philosophical
behaviorism have their roots in logical posi-
tivism. Where the two differ, however, is
the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle on
philosophical behaviorism. Ryle character-
izes the mind/body problem as a "category
mistake." 7 He gives the example of some-
one asking to see a university. After being
shown through the buildings, walked around
the grounds, introduced to the faculty and
students, the person asks, "Now can you
show me the university?" A category mis-
take is made by referring to the "univer-
sity"—or in this case the mind—as an inde-
pendent entity apart from its constituent el-
ements. Bechtel explains Wittgenstein's
view that philosophical problems, such as
the mind/body problem, arise when language
goes on holiday... [that is,] when we
misuse ordinary language. And that the
solution comes not in answering the
problems philosophers pose but by
dissolving the philosophical problems
by appealing to how we ordinarily use
the language. 8
Philosophical behaviorism, therefore,
is not an alternative to dualism or material-
ism, but seeks, rather, to eliminate the co-
nundrum by showing it to be a linguistic
problem. While most philosophical behav-
iorists are likely to be materialists, neither
form of behaviorism is logically inconsis-
tent with dualism. One could imagine that
mental phenomena, although not an appro-
priate subject of study for social scientists,
could ultimately be based in immaterial
mind-stuff.
Two-Aspect Theory
Barbour identifies the two-aspect theory
as the third of what he sees as the four main
alternatives to the mind/body problem. This
theory holds that some events have both a
physical and a mental aspect. In reality, the
two-aspect theory is but another version of
property dualism. According to Bechtel, it
is essentially epiphenomenalism. Barbour
includes analyses of ordinary language in the
category of two-aspect theory. However,
ordinary language philosophy is part of the
analytic tradition and is associated with
Wittgenstein and philosophical behaviorism,
among others.
Both the two-aspect theory and ordinary
language philosophy are important elements
in this discussion. However, they are dis-
tinct positions addressing different issues.
The first asserts that minds have simulta-
neously both a physical and a mental aspect,
similar to the wave-particle duality of quan-
tum physics. Minds are real entities with
real attributes that are the appropriate sub-
ject matter for the neurological and cogni-
tive sciences. The second is linguistic theory,
which focuses on how ordinary language is
used, including the way in which mental
events are classified. The first hypothesizes
an entity with two distinct but real aspects.
The other suggests one entity (with one "as-
pect"), which is referenced front different
linguistic perspectives. Neither is a stand-
alone theory. Two-aspect theory belongs to
property dualism and ordinary language phi-
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losophy is most closely related to philosophi-
cal behaviorism.
Multilevel Theories
Barbour seems to present a continuum
of treatments, with dualism at one end and
multilevel theories at the other. Interestingly,
this continuum more closely resembles a
circle in many respects, as multilevel theo-
ries come remarkably close to property du-
alism. Both positions hold that mental phe-
nomena are causal and, as Barbour says of
the multilevel view, "mental states and
physical events are totally dissimilar kinds
of things." 9 When discussing multilevel
theories and Roger Sperry, one of its chief
proponents, Barbour writes:
[I]n all organisms there is a hierarchy of
levels, with distinctive irreducible laws
at higher levels. Emergent, holistic
properties arise from organizational
relationships and configurational
patterns...."
1
Describing interactionist property dual-
ism, Churchland writes:
[M]ental properties are here said to be
emergent properties, properties that do
not appear at all until ordinary physical
matter has managed to organize itself,
through the evolutionary process, into a
system of sufficient complexity."
Even Descartes, the paradigmatic dual-
ist, might have passed as a multilevel theo-
rist when he repeatedly denied that the rela-
tion between mind and body is like that of a
pilot to a ship. Consider the following pas-
sage from "The Principles of Philosophy":
[T]here are... certain things which we
experience in ourselves and which
should be attributed neither to the mind
nor body alone, but to the close and
intimate union that exists between the
body and mind.... 12
Conclusion
What, then, can be said about the mind
and its relationship to the physical body?
Can it be deconstructed—analyzed and clas-
sified? Or should one simply appreciate the
mystery and complexity of the mind, as
Camus suggested in the case of one's natu-
ral surroundings? In the end, both will be
done, in all likelihood. As understanding of
the brain and its processes increases, so too
will the need to reconcile the often diver-
gent views of cognitive science, philosophy
and theology. Attempts to bridge these
realms must begin with a thorough and ac-
curate representation of a long tradition of
theorizing in the philosophy of mind.
Far from being resolved, the mind/body
problem remains one of the great mysteries
of the day. That an independent mind is so
central to the sense of self and yet remains
so difficult to support scientifically suggests
that there is need for ongoing debate, hy-
pothesis testing, and cultural grappling with
these issues. Because the notion of mind
goes to the very core of what it means to be
human, the implications of those discussions
are profound.
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